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1 The policies and practices of workers’ compensation have barely kept pace with the
changing worker and employer needs created by the growth of precarious forms of
employment. This study focused on how well workers’ compensation and RTW policies
in Ontario fit the needs of precariously employed workers. A critical discourse analysis
guided  our  study  which  consisted  of  in-depth  interviews  with  15  precariously-
employed  workers  and  5  employers  who  had  hired  and  managed  these  kinds  of
workers. Three domains where RTW policies that fit uneasily with the experiences of
precariously-employed workers were identified. These related to knowledge and power
contrasts between well-informed employers and vulnerable workers, injury attribution
challenges, and worker fear of speaking up about accidents. This study suggests that
workers’  compensation  and  RTW  policies  rest  uneasily  with  the  circumstances  of
precariously-employed workers.  In particular,  it  was difficult  for workers to engage
with workers’ compensation when employers resisted this process.
2 Developments in communication and other technologies, together with globalization of
economies,  have  led  to  flexible  labour  markets  and  changing  forms  of  work.  In
particular,  since  the  1990’s,  advanced economies  have  seen a  growth of  precarious
employment  (Kalleberg,  2011).  By  precarious,  we  refer  to  limited  term  contracts
(Galarneau, 2010), including temporary agency work (Bartkiw, 2018 ; Ducharme-Varin,
Vergara & Raynault, 2016), self-employment (Lippel and Laflamme, 2011) including gig
work (Bartel et al., 2019 ; De Stefano, 2016) and part-time, and minimum wage work.
What  these  forms  of  work  have  in  common  is  that  they  provide  flexibility  for
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employers  in  contexts  of  uncertain  and  competitive  trading  economies  while  also
downloading risk to workers, including creating a lack of income security (Broughton
et al., 2016).
3 Restricted  worker  bargaining  power,  limited  workplace  rights,  and  reduced  social
protection  are  all  found  with  precarious  employment  (Benach  et  al.,  2014).  While
precarious employment has been most often associated with low wages (Benach et al.,
2014 ; Burleton et al., 2013), recent research in Ontario, Canada, shows that precarity is
widespread and includes those with higher income and education levels (Lewchuk et
al.,  2014). Precarious employment is associated with poor mental health (Han et al.,
2017 ;  Ronnblad  et  al.,  2019),  greater  exposure  to  work  hazards  than  workers  in
standard jobs,  and limited manager and worker knowledge about health and safety
regulatory  responsibilities  (Howard,  2017 ;  MacEachen  et  al.,  2018 ;  Quinlan,  2004).
Research  on  temporary  work  agencies  has  identified  that  employment  and  safety
hazards  include  poor  training,  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  workplace,  fractured
communication, and financial incentives for client employers to maintain unsafe work
conditions  and  practices  (MacEachen  et  al.,  2012 ;  Quinlan,  Bohle  &  Rawlings-Way,
2015 ; Underhill and Quinlan, 2011).
4 Although  the  growth  of  precarious  employment  has  driven  thinking  and  policy
recommendations on how to address impacts of income insecurity, these have tended
to focus on welfare state regimes (Benach et al.,  2014) or on employment standards
(Weil, 2019). However, precarious employment has also limited workers’ access to work
disability  systems,  such  as  workers’  compensation,  as  regulatory  provisions  were
historically  designed  to  protect  workers  in  the  standard  employment  relationship,
based on full time, and indefinite work contracts. Workers’ compensation systems were
created in Canada in the early 1900’s to provide income support and health care to
workers who became injured or ill in the course of their employment. This system was
developed following a situation where juries began to favour workers and employers
found themselves suffering financial losses when losing injury cases under tort law.
Workers’  compensation  systems  created  a  “no  fault”  arrangement  that  provided
employers with the financial security of not being sued, and provided injured workers
with  healthcare  and  income  support  (AWCBC,  2013).  At  this  time,  workers’
compensation systems did not anticipate precarious employment relationships.  Still
today, most regulators have failed to adapt labour standards, workers’ compensation
and  occupational  health  and  safety  laws  to  the  needs  of  the  various  categories  of
precariously employed workers (Bartkiw, 2018 ; Ducharme-Varin, Vergara & Raynault,
2016 ;  Vosko  et  al.,  2018).  For  instance,  in  Ontario  self-employed  workers  are  not
required  to  have  WSIB  coverage  unless  they  work  in  the  construction  sector.  This
leaves  most  self-employed  workers,  including  the  growing  cohort  of  gig  workers,
without income protection if they become ill or injured (MacEachen et al., 2019). As
well, workers capable of working full time are often forced to work part-time or to hold
temporary jobs because they can’t find full time employment (Lewchuk, Clarke & de
Wolff, 2008 ; Patterson, 2018). When injured, their inability to work means lost income
from the job they were holding but also lost ability to earn income full-time. Quebec
workers’  compensation  legislation  acknowledges  this  by  presuming  all  workers  are
capable of earning full time minimum wage at the time of their injury ; however, in
Ontario part-time workers receive income benefits based only on 85 % of the net wage
earned from their current job, often an unsustainable amount on which to live (Lippel,
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2019). Each of these situations show the ill-fit between policies designed for workers in
standard employment relationships compared with those in precarious arrangements.
5 What we know less  about is  how workers who are precariously employed,  some of
whom fall within the scope of eligibility for workers’ compensation coverage and rights
to  reasonable  accommodation  and  return-to-work  support,  actually  access  these
supports.  Therefore,  our  study  was  focused  on  understanding  how  well  workers’
compensation and RTW policies fit  with the circumstances and needs of  precarious
workers. To do this, we focused on Ontario, Canada, and examined what role employers
played in supporting the rights of precariously employed workers to access resources
such as workers’ compensation, and how precariously employed workers experienced
accessing their rights to work disability supports.
 
1. Methodology
6 This  study1 extends  the  literature  on  precarious  employment  and  work  injury  by
drawing together and comparing employer and worker accounts of work injury and the
compensation  claim  filing  process.  Our  qualitative  study  was  guided  by  a  critical
discourse analysis approach, which captures how people think and talk about situations
(Hodges, Kuper & Reeves, 2008).
7 The study,  conducted in  2017,  was  based in  Ontario,  Canada,  where  the  Workplace
Safety  and  Insurance  Board  (WSIB),  provides  workers’  compensation  insurance
protection to approximately 75 % of employed workers (AWCBA, 2016). WSIB insurance
requires mandatory coverage of self-employed construction workers but not of other
self-employed individuals,  although they  may (but  rarely  do)  “opt  in”  to  coverage.
Employers are required to report all work-related injuries to WSIB, or risk a hefty fine
of $ 500,000 (Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997b). When an illness or injury
arises from work, covered workers are entitled to salary replacement benefits, health
care, and accommodated workplace tasks during employment reintegration. As well,
employers are obliged to provide accommodations to workers up to the point of undue
hardship  (Workplace  Safety  and  Insurance  Act,  1997a).  When  accommodation  is
required  for  a  worker  injured  on  the  job  who  has  filed  a  claim  for  workers’
compensation the compensation board, the WSIB is proactively involved in ensuring
that the employer complies with the legislation and accommodates the injured worker
as early as possible.
 
2. Sample and data
8 Our  sample  consisted  of  in-depth,  semi-structured  interviews  with  precariously-
employed  workers  and  with  employers  who  hired  these  kinds  of  workers.  Our
definition  of  precarious  employment  included  workers  who  had  temporary/limited
term employment contracts, worked part-time, were paid minimum wage, or who were
self-employed. Our purposive sampling strategy targeted any workers meeting these
precarious employment criteria, who could communicate in English and who within
the past 10 years had experienced a workplace injury or illness that would warrant a
lost-time workers’ compensation claim. Workers were included whether or not they
had filed a WSIB claim.
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9 We recruited workers via social media (e.g. Kijiji, Craig’s List), fliers posted in public
locations, and through leads provided by members of our study’s Advisory Committee.
An honorarium of $ 50 was paid to participating workers to cover any costs related to
their participation. Our employer sample included any employers who had hired and
managed precariously-employed workers and had experience of managing work injury
among these workers. The employers were identified via website searches and then
recruited  through  cold-calling.  For  the  purpose  of  our  study,  we  use  the  term
“employer” to denote anyone in a managerial position who played a role in managing
precariously employed workers.
10 Our final sample included 20 participants : 15 workers and 5 employers. The workers
included 7 women and 8 men. Seven worked for temporary work agencies, 4 were on
seasonal or limited term contracts, and the remaining 4 were minimum waged (also
part-time  for  2).  None  of  the  workers  were  temporary  foreign  workers  employed
through government programs. The 5 employers occupied the following roles : director
of human resources, occupational health nurse, sales manager, recruitment supervisor,
and health and safety coordinator. They came from temporary work agencies, mines,
and a cleaning and maintenance company. See Table 1 for sample detail.
 
Table 1. Sample
Pseudonym Worker / Employer Gender Type of Precarious work / Employer
Jason W M Temporary employment agency
Seth W M Fixed-term contract
Alice W F Seasonal worker
Ben W M Temporary employment agency
Mary W F Seasonal worker
Scott W M Temporary employment agency
Peter W M Temporary employment agency
Kobe W M Temporary employment agency
Victor W M Fixed-term contract
Louise W F Probationary contract
Shannon W F Temporary employment agency
Gretchen W F Part-time, minimum wage
Yvonne W F Part-time, minimum wage
Brenda W F Part-time
David W M Temporary employment agency
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Lauren E F Cleaning/maintenance company
Marisa E F Temporary employment agency
Lucas E M Temporary employment agency
Claire E F Mine
Jessica E F Mine
11 Two aspects of this sample are worth noting. First, a complexity in the employment
relationship for temporary agency workers and employers as compared to others in
this sample is the triangular nature of temporary agency employment relationships.
That is, although the temporary agency is the legal employer of the temporary worker,
it is the client employer to whom they are sent who directly oversees the worker’s
working  conditions  and  performance.  With  this  arrangement,  agency  workers  are
exposed to particular work and health-related communication gaps and safety risks
(MacEachen et al., 2012). A second aspect of this sample is that employers who agreed
to be interviewed might have been the “better” ones. That is, employers with poorer
working  conditions  might  not  have  wished  to  participate  in  this  study.  As  such,
conditions for workers may be less favorable than what emerged in our results below.
12 Interviews were conducted in-person or by telephone and lasted on average one hour.
Questions to workers focused on describing their job and workplace, their injury and
related contact with workplace managers and workers’ compensation, their experience
with  return  to  work (if  relevant)  and  the  impact  of  their  injury  on  their  lives.
Employers were asked about their job and workplace, their role and experience of work
injury  and  return  to  work  for  workers  under  their  supervision,  their  view  and
knowledge  of  workers’  compensation  return  to  work  policies,  and  their  particular
experiences  with  managing  return  to  work  for  precariously employed  workers.
Detailed field notes were prepared following each interview to capture the context of
the  encounter  (processes  for  setting  up  the  interview,  mood  of  the  interview,  e.g.
participant nervousness) as well as analytic notes related to the interview (reflections
on  new  interview  questions  that  might  be  posed,  how  this  interview  compares  to
others, new insights in this interview).
13 Ethical approval for this study was provided by the University of Waterloo Office of
Research  Ethics  and  the  Office  of  Research  Ethics  at  the  University  of  Ottawa.  All
interviews were conducted with informed consent and participants were assured of
confidentiality and anonymity. No personal identifiers were used and each participant
was assigned a pseudonym.
 
3. Data management and analysis
14 A concurrent  data  gathering and analysis  approach was  used to  analyze  data.  This
approach allowed us to adjust and improve interview questions as we learned more
about our topic. For instance, we added a question to ask employers specifically about
self-employed  workers  on  their  premises  following  a  worker  interview  that  drew
attention to this issue. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by
Workers’ compensation claims for precariously employed workers in Ontario: em...
Perspectives interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé, 23-1 | 2021
5
an experienced transcriptionist and organized using NVivo qualitative software (QSR
International  (version  10),  2014).  Codes  were  developed  by  the  team  based  on
established areas of analytic interest (such as “workplace accommodations”, and also
on codes that developed as we analyzed the data, such as “misrepresentation”, which
captured  participant  interactions  around  return  to  work  rights  and  obligations.
Analysis  of  discourse  proceeded  through  detailed  readings  of  field  notes  and
transcripts,  and  through  comparing  coded  segments  across  interviews.  Detailed
summaries  were  made  of  each  code.  The  critical  examination  of  discourse  focused
analytic attention on the positionality of the speaker, their investment in the situation,
and how they described events.  For instance,  when the temporary agency manager
described WSIB agents  as  “on our side”,  this  provided insight  into power relations
between  employers  and  workers  in  relation  to  compensation  claims,  and  also  the
importance to the agency of cultivating preferential relationships with WSIB agents.
During this analysis, regular investigator meetings were held to interrogate the data
and form conclusions for the study findings.
 
4. Findings
15 Our findings focus on three key domains where the RTW policies appear to fit uneasily
with the experiences of precariously employed workers. First, we show the knowledge
and  power  contrast  between  well-informed employers  and  vulnerable  workers  and
explain how this shapes employer support of RTW. Second, we address the problematic
issue of injury attribution for workers who regularly change jobs. Finally, we address
workers’ ability to speak up when they are insecurely employed.
 
5. Knowledge and power differences
16 Although  the  Workplace  Safety  and  Insurance  Act  that  governs  the  WSIB  obliges
Ontario employers to accommodate injured workers, we found that employers in our
study did not always offer accommodations to support workers’ RTW and workers did
not always know that they were entitled to them. A key challenge for the precariously
employed  workers  in  our  study  was  that  they  were  injured  while  also  financially
insecure  and  inexpert  at  navigating  employment  and  compensation  systems.  In
contrast, the employers in our study were strategic and well-informed. In particular, by
hiring workers on limited term contracts or via temporary work agencies, employers
were calculating in their approach to limiting the cost and use of human resources.
17 Unlike workers who, prior to their work injury, often had little experience of how to
navigate workers’ compensation systems, the employers in our study had experience
and knowledge of the system. Indeed, some had developed familiar relationships with
compensation agents and hinted at receiving preferential treatment from them :
We are organized, we have everything up to date…. Usually they [WSIB] are on our
side…  We  have  had  a  pretty  good  rapport  with  them.  (Lucas,  temporary  work
agency manager)
18 Employers’  strategic  use  of  labour  was  evident  when  they  used  self-employed
contractors  to  complete  tasks,  as  this  removed  them  from  employer-related
obligations. The goal, when hiring such workers for specific tasks was simply to get the
job done, and not to be responsible for any resulting injuries :
Workers’ compensation claims for precariously employed workers in Ontario: em...
Perspectives interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé, 23-1 | 2021
6
How could we give [self-employed contractors] modified work [following a work-
related injury] ? They have a specific contract to do a specific job. If they cannot do
it, we will take someone else because it has to be done. (Claire, occupational health
nurse)
19 A similar strategic mindset was found among temporary work agencies, such as this
employer who described the need to take a “business perspective” that screened out
employment for workers who were injured or unhealthy :
A client … would be, you know, looking for the best of the best when it comes to
workers…. If a worker comes and they have got, you know, a previous work-related
injury on their ... record …like I am thinking from my business perspective. (Lucas,
temporary work agency manager)
20 A challenge faced by workers who were employed on temporary contracts is that they
were screened by employers  for  health status over and over again,  each time they
sought a new contract.  This repeated screening exposed workers to employers who
used strategies to actively avoid relationships with workers who might experience or
complain about a work injury. For example, this temporary agency employer described
how she used what seemed like a caring approach to interview workers, while actively
screening out workers on the basis of health :
On our application process it does ask...about allergies and if there’s any… physical
restrictions that…we may have to take into consideration when placing them at a
job…. So they actually fill all of that out and, and then during the interview process
we … go over it  again and, and I  mean you are going to be blown away by the
amount of people that go, “Oh, well ... there was that time when I hurt my back”,
and blah, blah, blah. Well, red flag, you know what I mean ? (Marissa, temp agency
employer)
21 When workers passed employers’ screening process but then later experienced a work-
related  injury,  employers  in  our  study  activated  new  strategies  for  limiting  their
compensation-related costs and responsibility. Some mis-informed workers by telling
them that they were not eligible for workers’ compensation. Workers who were told
this felt they had little recourse other than to accept their situation :
They said  again  that  they  wouldn’t  be  able  to  assist  me because  it  had been a
contract where no staff had been listed on the invoice. So … they had no record of
any of their staff actually working for the banquet hall. … And I was told I could be
easily replaced, so not in so many words but that was… the consensus. (Scott, temp
agency worker)
22 In another case, an employer simply laid off a young and inexperienced worker who
was on a probationary contract for a full-time permanent position. The employer made
no reference to the worker’s right to access workers’ compensation. The worker, who
sustained  lasting  injuries,  was  at  the  time  not  familiar  with  the  concept  of
accommodation and compensation and did not access it :
[My boss] called and she was like, “Oh, I heard … you got hurt. I just want to hear
about that.” …. She is like, “I am sorry to hear about all this. I was just taking a look
over your files and I see that …you have been great … however we are going to have
to determine whether you are still a good fit given the nature of the job. (Louise,
full-time worker, probationary contract)
23 Not all workers in our study were unaware of workers’ compensation and their rights
to claim benefits. However, the workers who did try to activate their right to claim
describe being met with employer resistance. For instance, one minimum-wage retail
worker  who  sustained  a  serious  eye  injury  at  work  managed  to  file  a  successful
workers’  compensation  claim  by  drawing  in  paperwork  from  her  family  doctor.
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However, during the work accommodation process, she found herself being assigned to
increasingly poor shifts and, in the context of this negative social environment, she
decided  to  quit  her  job.  This  subtle  bullying  of  the  worker,  in  turn,  successfully
removed all costs and liability from the employer.
 
6. The problem of injury attribution
24 A  second  key  domain  where  the  RTW  policies  appear  to  fit  uneasily  with  the
experiences of precariously employed workers was injury attribution. Essentially, when
workers  changed  jobs  regularly,  or  had  two  part-time  jobs,  employers  could  avoid
responsibility because it became difficult for workers to attribute an injury to a specific
workplace. In the case of a worker with two concurrent jobs, an employer could quite
easily  contest  liability  by suggesting that  the injury occurred at  the “other” job.  A
worker in our study who faced this situation quickly chose to discontinue her workers’
compensation claim, for fear of jeopardizing her continued employment at her main
job :
So I submitted the claim to the WSIB and then I spoke to the … manager [at my
workplace]  and I  expressed desire  to  return to  accommodated work in  the box
office. She said, “We know you didn’t injure yourself on the job”. …. She said, “Well,
we know that you did it [at your] dog walking [gig]”. (Gretchen, minimum wage,
entertainment sector)
25 The  burden  of  proof  for  workers’  compensation  claims  appeared  to  rest  with  the
workers, rather than with the employer. In this next situation, a young worker had a
seasonal  job  in  the  forestry  sector  where  her  colleagues  were  temporary  foreign
workers when she fell and hurt her back. The workers’ compensation board requested
witness  testimony,  which  was  not  possible  because  the  workers  had  dispersed  and
returned to their home countries. The worker found her claim denied :
They [WSIB] called me… and they needed proof that it had happened and I was
saying that … the only person who had been there when I actually got hurt was my
co-worker but he had moved back to South America and I didn’t have a contact
number for him. So … they said, they would … try and find a contact number for
him and then I got a letter a week later saying they had rejected it [my WSIB claim].
(Alice, seasonal forest worker)
26 Employers in our study voiced suspicion of precariously employed workers who filed
claims for workers’ compensation. Indeed, some suggested that workers intentionally
or carelessly injured themselves :
So, if it’s a situation where they were being unsafe almost intentionally and they
ended up getting injured, I mean, obviously we try to say, “Alright, what did we do
wrong here ? What could we have done to…. prevent this injury ?” …. If the person
was…not doing what they were supposed to be doing, we are going to write them up
for it. And a lot of cases an employer or a client would not want them back for
that…. They are just a danger to themselves and others. (Lucas, temporary work
agency manager)
27 Injury  attribution  left  workers  in  a  difficult  situation.  WSIB  and  employers  raised
doubts  about  the  veracity  of  injuries,  and  one  employer  went  so  far  as  to  suggest
intentional injuries.
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7. Workers’ ability to speak up
28 Workers’ ability to speak up about employment conditions in the context of precarious
employment arrangements was a third key domain where the RTW policies appear to
fit uneasily with the experiences of precariously employed workers. Although worker
awareness raising and knowledge of their health and safety rights is often a focus for
policy-makers (Dean, 2010), this strategy appeared to be ineffective in the context of
precarious work conditions. That is, even when precariously employed workers were
fully  aware  of  their  rights  to  access workers’  compensation,  they were  also  keenly
aware that doing so may mean loss of their employment. In the following example, a
personal support worker was too fearful to file a claim, despite being urged to file by
her family doctor :
She [family doctor] wanted me to [file a WSIB claim] …. That’s one thing I really,
really … regret not doing [because of ongoing health problems].  I  didn’t end up
filling it out because I was in such fear about my company. I was worried that they
might come after me. I was worried that they might fire me. I was worried that they
might give me less  shifts….  Like,  I  was just  had so much anxiety.  ….  I  was just
constantly  fearful  that  I  basically  didn’t  do  anything”.  (Shannon,  nursing  temp
agency worker)
29 Employers in our study were aware that workers were fearful of speaking up about
work-related  injuries  for  fear  of  losing  their  jobs.  Indeed,  one  employer  described
workers trying to maintain their employability by explaining away work injuries as
“personal illnesses” or not declaring them :
I see a difference [between permanent workers and those on fixed-term contracts]
in the sense that they, when they have an injury some of them may not be inclined
to declare it because they are afraid that we will, it will affect them in having a
possible full-time position. So, they tend to hide the injury, they tend to not declare
them….  [They  avoid  seeing  me  for  care  because]  they  were  afraid  I  think  of
retaliation. (Claire, occupational health nurse)
30 In sum, these findings paint a picture of how some employers who strategically hire
workers on precarious employment conditions react negatively to workplace injuries
among  these  workers.  In  a  context  of  extreme  knowledge  and  power  differences
between  employers  and  precariously  employed  workers  in  relation  to  navigating
workers’  compensation  systems,  employers  described  a  variety  of  strategies  for
avoiding the costs and liability of workers’  compensation claims. At the same time,
workers  described their  fears  and concerns about  maintaining their  employment if
they asked employers for formal recognition of their work-related injuries. In some
cases, workers’ health problems lingered for some time following the unaccommodated
injury, but workers coped with them privately.
 
8. Discussion
31 This study was focused on understanding how well workers’ compensation and RTW
policies fit  with the circumstances and needs of precarious workers.  To do this,  we
examined how these workers and employers who hired such workers managed work
injury and access to workers’ compensation. Employer discourses of workers needing
to be “the best of the best”, being “easily replaced”, and “not a good fit” once they were
injured, revealed a positioning of workers as a dispensable product. When an employer
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described a worker injured at the workplace as “a danger to themselves and others”,
blame for the event was situated with worker behaviour, rather than with the quality
of management and safety of the work environment. With these rhetorical strategies,
employers distanced themselves morally from a position of responsibility for workers’
health, leaving workers without the support they needed to fully access any rights they
might have to workers’ compensation, all within the context of a “no fault” workers’
compensation  system.  Blaming  workers  in  a  no-fault  system has  been  documented
elsewhere  (Lippel,  1999),  as  has  the  stigma  associated  with  claiming  workers’
compensation  (Eakin,  MacEachen  &  Clarke,  2003).  Precarious  employment  is
advantageous to employers. For example, it is convenient for client employers to use
workers  employed by  temporary  work  agencies,  as  this  allows  them to  avoid  legal
responsibilities ; directly hiring temporary or part time employees also minimizes cost
to  the  organisations  (e.g.  low  wages,  no  benefits  provided  to  workers)  (Busby  &
Muthukumaran, 2019 ; MacEachen et al., 2012). In this context, we saw that the ways in
which employers informed workers about their rights, in turn, shaped workers’ own
actions and possibilities for workers’ compensation or support. In a context where the
law requires  the employer to  report  work injuries  to  the WSIB,  it  was possible  for
workers to be misinformed or dissuaded from accessing their rights to compensation.
As well,  our findings reinforce how both workers and employers were aware of the
workers’ economic insecurity and how this condition stunted workers’ ability to speak
up about poor work conditions and injuries. 
32 Clearly, not all employers distance themselves from their responsibilities in the way
that we saw with employers in this study. However, what this study reveals are weak
points  in  RTW  policy,  which  allow  for  the  possibility  of  employers  distancing
themselves from work injury responsibilities, and which heighten the likelihood that
workers will not stand up to employers. 
33 Incentives for workers to remain silent have problematic implications for occupational
health  and  safety  issues.  Occupational  health  and  safety  legislation  rests  on  the
assumption that workers will speak up about occupational hazards and injuries. Indeed,
in Ontario, this principle is inherent in worker’s legal “right to refuse” unsafe work
(Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1990) as well as “internal responsibility systems”
that  require  employers  and  workers  to  cooperatively  manage  health  and  safety
approaches  within  workplaces  (Dean,  2010).  It  is  regularly  suggested  that,  if
precariously employed workers were better educated about their rights,  they might
gain  improved  access  to  their occupational  health  and  safety  rights  (Dean,  2010).
However, a growing body of evidence draws attention to power relations and economic
insecurity that stifle worker voice (Gray, 2002 ; Hall, 2016 ; King and LOARC members,
2010 ;  Manapragada  and  Bruk-Lee,  2016).  That  is,  this  study  and  others  show  that
workers choose to not speak up about their workplace injuries and exposure to hazards
because they do not want to jeopardize their tenuous jobs and income (Hall, 2016 ; Hall
et al., 2013 ; MacEachen et al., 2012). As well, stigma of being seen as problematic or
trying to “take advantage” of the compensation system can prevent injury reporting
(Côté  et  al.,  2020).  Interestingly,  worker  fear  of  reporting  workplace  accidents  is
widespread, occurring also among unionized workers (Lewchuk, 2013). A consequence
of  under-reported  workplace  injuries  is  reduced  access  to  treatment  and  non-
accommodation of injuries, leading to potential compounding effects of further injuries
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resulting  in  a  costlier  recovery  that  is  shouldered  by  the  broader  taxpayer-funded
social security system (Lippel, 1999 ; MacEachen et al., 2010).
34 This study contributes to the scarce literature on the ways in which employers de-
legitimise  the  injury  claims  of  precariously  employed workers  (Gravel  et  al.,  2006 ;
Gravel et al.,  2017).  In this study, employers challenged workers about whether the
injury could be attributed to their workplace and described accidents as due to their
own carelessness (“they are just a danger to themselves”). Employers also recognized
that workers would not challenge such discourses because of their fear of employer
retaliation and job loss. These stances exist in a context where employers have little
financial  initiative  to  invest  in  relationships  with  workers  who  are  temporary  or
minimum wage. This social distance between employers and workers is even greater
for  temporary  agency  workers,  who  are  employed  by  the  agency  but  overseen  on
worksites by supervisors of the client employer (Chambel and Castanheira, 2006).
35 Workers in this study appeared resigned to their difficult employment conditions (“I
was told I could be easily replaced”) and lack of access to worker rights to work injury
compensation. Indeed, in precarious employment literature published two decades ago,
worker’s “consent” to poor working conditions was recognized as occurring amidst an
environment  of  unease  and  instability  in  which  workers  were  cognizant  of  their
dispensability (Smith, 1997). Burawoy (1979) described the “manufacturing of consent”
to poor work conditions as akin to inviting workers to play a game in which there is a
limited set of choices. Only within this kind of restricted arena, do workers “choose” to
not activate their rights to workers’ compensation for occupational injuries.
36 Injury attribution is a particular problem facing workers who change jobs often or who
hold concurrent jobs, a finding documented in other studies looking at non-standard
employment relationships (Quinlan and Mayhew, 1999 ; Underhill and Quinlan, 2011).
In these circumstances, it becomes very difficult for them to prove that an occupational
injury is attributable to any one job. Although Ontario’s WSIB has a “benefit of doubt”
policy that settles a claim in favour of the worker when “the evidence for or against the
issue is approximately equal in weight” (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2004),
in practice, workers are outmaneuvered by employers given their relative unfamiliarity
with the compensation system and their limited resources with which to contest an
employer.
37 Galanter, an American legal theorist, has written extensively on the consequences of
disparity in power between claimants and defendants in the context of legal recourse
(Galanter, 1974, 2006). Our findings fit well with his analysis : employers are repeat-
players in the workers’ compensation system, they know the ropes and they often have
ongoing relationships with the compensation authority. Workers, on the other hand,
are unlikely to be repeat players in the compensation system. They usually have one
work accident and must rapidly become familiar with the system, while their more
experienced employer has the upper hand in terms of knowledge and economic weight.
The power disparity between the parties is exacerbated by precarious employment as
those workers are the least likely to have the support of a union, an actor that can also
be a repeat player in a workers’ compensation system. While Galanter was describing
the American court system, and while workers’ compensation systems were designed to
expunge the adversarial nature of compensation for injury (Lippel, 1999), our findings
suggest  that  the  workers’  compensation  system  in  Ontario  may  be  unsuccessful  in
responding to the imbalance of power between workers and employers. As well, the
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legislation  governing  WSIB  does  not  legally  require  corroboration  of  a  worker’s
description of how their injury occurred if medical evidence confirms the injury and
the worker’s  description of  the event that  led to the injury is  compatible  with the
injury. Requiring workers to have witnesses to their injury, as occurred for a worker in
our sample, cannot be explained by the current legislative provisions, all the more so
because of the “benefit of the doubt” policy.
38 Employers in this study did little to support the precariously-employed workers’ rights
to workers’ compensation and in some cases appeared to actively discourage claims. A
relevant  context  for  employer  behaviour  is  the ever-expanding  power  and  income
differences between employers and workers that we have seen in recent decades. While
in 1965, an employer’s wages were, on average, 20 times that of the typical worker, in
2016,  that  ratio  had  grown  to  271  to  one  (Mishel  and  Scheider,  2017).  This  is
accompanied by shrinking private sector labour unions (Statistics Canada, 2018). With
these changes to organizational conditions comes a change in the social contract, that
is,  common  understandings  of  how  to  fairly  distribute  power  and  resources  (ILO,
2016b ; MacEachen, 2019). In recent decades, employers have increasingly turned to low
stakes (e.g. minimum wage, part-time) or non-binding (e.g. limited term contract, self-
employment)  relationships  with  workers  (ILO,  2016a).  Although  flexible work
arrangements  are  related  to  employers’  need  for  organizational  flexibility  amid
competitive global marketplaces, what is relevant for workers’ compensation policy is
how extreme employer-worker inequalities accompany this flexibility,  to the extent
that  one  employer  in  our  study  avoided  labour  responsibilities  by  dismissing  low-
waged workers as “being unsafe almost intentionally”.
39 A limitation of this study is its small sample size and limited jurisdictional focus. It
would  be  useful  to  gather  more  data  about  the  interactions  between  precariously-
employed workers and the employers who hire them in order to better understand how
workers manage to access their rights to workers’ compensation and accommodated
RTW and what policy changes might better support the growing precariously employed
workforce. Further research could also include inter-jurisdictional comparisons of how
precariously employed workers adequately access income and injury support following
work-related injury and illness.
 
9. Conclusion
40 This study suggests that Ontario workers’  compensation and RTW policies may rest
uneasily  with the circumstances  of  precariously-employed workers.  In  particular,  it
was  difficult  for  workers  to  make  workers’  compensation  claims,  or  to  sustain  a
successful  claim, when employers resisted this  process.  We show how employers of
precarious  workers  were  well-informed  and  able  to  maneuver  around  their  less-
informed  workers  so  as  to  avoid  claim  submissions.  Injury  attribution,  which  is
particularly  problematic  when  workers  are  working  concurrent  part-time  jobs  or
short-term jobs, was another area where employers could contest claims. Finally, our
study explained how precariously-employed workers face difficulties speaking up about
workplace injuries  as  this  might  lead to  deteriorated working conditions,  including
poor  shifts  and  potential  lay  off.  The  employers  in  our  study  hired  workers  in
precarious contracts for organizational convenience and it was not clear that they saw
themselves as morally responsible for precariously employed injured or ill  workers.
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Further research is  needed on the insights and strategies of  precariously employed
workers and employers who hire these workers in order to identify key areas for policy
reform.
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RÉSUMÉS
Les politiques et pratiques concernant l’indemnisation des victimes de lésions professionnelles
n’ont pas suivi le rythme des besoins changeants des travailleurs et employeurs résultant de la
croissance de l’emploi précaire. Dans cette étude, nous avons cherché à savoir si les politiques
concernant  l’indemnisation  et  le  retour  au  travail  répondaient  aux  besoins  des  travailleurs
ontariens qui occupent un emploi précaire. Une analyse critique du discours a guidé l’étude, qui a
consisté en entrevues en profondeur menées auprès de quinze travailleurs occupant un emploi
précaire et de cinq employeurs qui ont embauché et dirigé ce genre de travailleurs. Nous avons
identifié  trois  domaines  pour  lesquels  les  politiques  de  retour  au  travail  ne  sont  pas  en
adéquation  avec  les  besoins  des  travailleurs  précaires.  Il  s’agit  de  l’écart  en  matière  de
connaissances et de pouvoir entre les employeurs bien informés et les travailleurs vulnérables,
des défis liés à l’attribution des blessures et de la crainte des travailleurs à parler ouvertement de
leurs  accidents  de  travail.  Les  résultats  de  cette  étude  indiquent  que  les  politiques
d’indemnisation et de retour au travail ne sont pas en adéquation avec les besoins des
travailleurs occupant un emploi précaire. En particulier, nous avons observé qu’il était difficile
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pour eux de faire une demande d’indemnisation quand les employeurs montraient une certaine
résistance en cours de processus.
The policies and practices of workers’ compensation have barely kept pace with the changing
worker and employer needs created by the growth of precarious forms of employment.  This
study focused on how well workers’ compensation and RTW policies in Ontario fit the needs of
precariously employed workers. A critical discourse analysis guided our study which consisted of
in-depth interviews with 15 precariously-employed workers and 5 employers who had hired and
managed  these  kinds  of  workers.  Three  domains  where  RTW  policies  fit  uneasily  with  the
experiences of precariously-employed workers were identified. These related to knowledge and
power contrasts between well-informed employers and vulnerable workers, injury attribution
challenges, and worker fear of speaking up about accidents. This study suggests that workers’
compensation and RTW policies rest uneasily with the circumstances of precariously-employed
workers. In particular, it  was difficult for workers to engage with/make a claim for workers’
compensation when employers resisted this process.
INDEX
Keywords : return to work, precarious employment, precarious workers, worker benefit,
vulnerable workers
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